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To the centre of any empire, the frontier is a site of 
anxiety, of potential harm, of barbarians who could be 
marching towards the gate. The imperial imaginations of 
the medieval Arab dynasties, the colonial British, and 
now the United States have been dominated by this 
anxiety. We have to plant our historiographical feet in 
the frontier space of present-day Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and north India to see the concerns which emerge from 
within a regional imagination, in a regionally specific 
conversation and in regional stories. Situating ourselves 
in the frontier reveals varied perspectives that are 
invisible to the imperial eye. To pay attention to the 
localised production of history and memory is to 
decontextualise the only context that appears relevant 
– the imperial one. This shift in perspective reveals that 
the oft-designated “frontier” has a centrality all of its own.
Prologue
In az-Zubayr’s Kitāb al-Hadāyā wa al-Tuhaf (Book of Gifts and Precious Items), a catalogue, created in the 11th century, of tributes collected by Muslim kings over the centuries, is a re-
port about a fragment of a mirror, which was received as tribute 
by the Umayyad caliph Mu‘āwiya b Abi Sufiyān (d 680) from the 
king of al-Qiqān near al-Sind.1 Since 660 CE (Common Era), the 
Arab armies were engaged in extending tributaries in the Thughr 
al-Hind w’al Sind (frontier of al-Hind and al-Sind), slowly making 
their way east of Khurusān, Kirmān, Sāstān, and Makrān (present 
cities such as Kandahar in Afghanistan, Lahore, the regions of 
Waziristan, Baluchistan, and the port city of Sindh in Pakistan). 
It was Adam, az-Zubayr reports, who received this mirror from 
god, upon his descent from heaven, so that “he could see  whatever 
he wished on earth”, no matter in conditions good or bad. 
Mu‘āwiya used the mirror to examine for himself the conditions at 
the frontier of his dominion, to know and check on his appointed 
governors and commanders in the distant battlegrounds of al-
Hind w’al Sind. This mirror, now a fragment of  governance, re-
mained in Mu‘āwiya’s personal possession until the ‘Abbasid times 
(mid-8th century onwards), after which it was  reportedly lost. 
A metaphorical reading of the 11th century re-imagination of the 
Umayyad frontier policy needs to retain both the mystery and the 
danger of that frontier. It ought to capture the anxiety that the frontier 
continuously produces in the seat of putative power – what is going 
on so far away?2 It is an anxiety that paradoxically internalises a 
peculiar fascination with the frontier even as it pushes away more 
robust understandings – it simultaneously keeps the frontier a 
known object and an unknowable terrain. The fragment of the mirror 
acts as an apt metaphor for this tension – a mirror that reflects not 
the viewer but the distant other, and not just any other but a specific 
other that denotes potential danger. The frontier itself is a site of 
anxiety, of potential harm, of barbarians who could be marching 
towards the gate.3 It is this anxiety, this particular reading of the 
frontier that tends to dominate the imperial imagination – it clouds 
over the historical contingencies, the particularities or the specifici-
ties, and those instated there; in its place is a caricature of the ex-
otic, the unknown. This anxiety of the empire embeds itself in the 
frontier itself, waiting to be recalled, remembered and reproduced. 
On 29 January 2009, at the Senate confirmation hearing for US 
Secretary of State nominee Hillary R Clinton, Senator John 
Kerry, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, made 
the following remarks: 
We are struggling to fight with and for people with a different culture, a 
different language, different custom, different history, different religion, 
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if any. And all of those similarities exist. We don’t live there. We don’t 
live in the community, in a hamlet, in a small town, pocket, whatever 
you want to call it. And so we’re not there often at night. They are. And 
the night often rules with insurgencies. The complications are pro-
found in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. And I went to both – and to 
India – immediately after Mumbai and was really struck by the ex-
traordinary distance we have to travel in both places, Senator. … It 
left – it kept leaping out at me in ways that, over a number of years 
here, I really, frankly had not given enough consideration to. But re-
cently read a wonderful book when I commend to you by Rory Stew-
art, you know, The Places in Between and another book, The Forever 
War and a whole host of them that really give you the flavour of this if 
you really want it – I mean, Gertrude Bell, the Desert Queen is a fasci-
nating study of sort of the region and of tribalism. And that’s really 
what I want to point to.4
Clinton’s answering remarks echoed Kerry’s reading as well as 
his particular teleology, 
Sitting here today, when I think about my trips to Afghanistan, my 
flying over that terrain, my awareness of the history going back to Al-
exander the Great and, certainly, the imperial British military and 
Rudyard Kipling’s memorable poems about Afghanistan, the Soviet 
Union, which put in more troops than we’re thinking about putting in 
– I mean, it calls for a large doze of humility about what it is we are 
trying to accomplish.5
Starkly present in Senator Kerry’s language is the frontier, 
though he will never use that word. The space he describes is at 
the edge, chaotic, destructive, dark, unknowable. Here, the role 
of Adam’s mirror is played by the literary reporter, dispatched 
from the empire out to the frontier, the Rudyard Kipling, the Rory 
Stewart, the T E Lawrence, the Gertrude Bell; those who can 
walk, mingle, pass through that frontier to either reproduce it in 
a image of the capital or reproduce an image of it for the capital. 
Here again is the mystery and danger of the frontier, invoked 
 either in romantic tones or in catastrophic ones. 
In the teleology of empires that Clinton presents – from Alexan-
der, to the British, to the Soviet and finally, to the US – is another 
manifestation of the anxiety produced by the frontier, the forget-
ting of known pasts, the eliding of known geographies, the delib-
erately maintained distance from the frontier. The genealogy re-
flects not only the specific links between empires and that par-
ticular frontier but also the pasts that the empire chooses to ac-
knowledge, reflect on and know. Afghanistan, Pakistan – espe-
cially the regions of Waziristan, Baluchistan and lower Sindh – 
act as the internal frontiers of the US empire. In the language of 
empire, this frontier space is posited as both empty (figuratively 
speaking) and chaotic (analytically speaking). It becomes a site 
of continuous contestation and battle and always remains, by 
definition, far removed from the ordered capital. It is in a state of 
permanent displacement, filled only by transitive populations. It 
is liminal, in the sense that it is at the margins, between zones, at 
the edge, unable to produce subjectivities of its own. Its inhabit-
ants cannot be visualised historically, politically, or socially. It is 
this liminal nature, this existence outside law’s writ that, on the 
one hand, allows the drones to fly over the region, dispensing 
“frontier justice” (to evoke the American West), without the ex-
plicit need of trial, juries or judges, and on the other hand, allows 
the empire only a peculiarly circumscribed knowledge of it. The 
Adam’s mirror of the Umayyad is now recreated as the 5,500 metre 
high camera on an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and the ambu-
latory viewpoint of British academic, author and politician Rory 
Stewart.
Viewed through the drone’s camera, the frontier is both utterly 
knowable and maddeningly unknown. This capacity to crowd 
out all other narratives about the space it demarcates as “fron-
tier” belongs only to the empire, and so it is to imperial history 
that we must first turn. Not to explain imperial histories but to 
showcase, in the archives of an empire far removed from our 
present, the very same gestures of framing the frontier as can be 
seen in the British or the US cases. In what follows, I want to in-
terrupt time as it flows in Clinton’s formulation. I want to bring 
into the conversation the Umayyad empire and its relationship to 
the frontier. I do so to highlight that particular ways of knowing 
and unknowing the frontier are constitutive of imperial experi-
ence, and tracing these pathways of knowledge illustrates the 
unknown terrain to which frontiers are routinely confined. Next, 
I want to plant our historiographical feet in the frontier space it-
self to see the concerns which emerge from within a regional im-
agination, in a regionally specific conversation and in regional 
stories. Situating ourselves in the frontier reveals new topogra-
phies, varied perspectives, networks and routes that are invisible 
to the imperial eye. 
The First Frontier
The Arab expansion towards the frontier of al-Hind w’al-Sind – 
roughly peninsular southern Asia, using the Indus River as a 
natural boundary between al-Sind (the regions to the north and 
west) and al-Hind (the regions to the east) – began largely as a 
result of the re-entrenchment of the last of the Sasanid nobility in 
the eastern hinterlands of Khurusān and Kirmān in the mid-seventh 
century. By 700 CE, the regions of Sīstan and Makrān – with im-
portant garrison sites such as Kandahar – were constantly switch-
ing alliances, revolting, and both attracting and exporting rebel-
lious elements, ideologies and assassins against the Umayyad 
court in Damascus and the major cities of Basra and Kufa. Efforts 
to “control” this region eventually led to the successful campaign 
of 712 CE that established Umayyad garrisons in the ports on the 
Indus River and opened a secure naval route from Aden to Sindh. 
The victory, like all previous victories in the region, was short-
lived and throughout the eighth century, numerous expeditions 
were dispatched to the frontier, as the Gurjara-Partiharas in the 
north-west and the Rashtrakutas in the Deccan maintained a 
tumultuous coexistence with the Arab-Muslim principality.
The anxiety of harm that exists on the military frontier is aptly 
captured in Arabic historical and exegetical tradition. In the section 
on the frontier of al-Hind wa’l Sind in the Kitāb Futāh al-Buldān 
(The Book of Conquest of Lands) by al-Balādhurī (d 892), there 
are repeated invocations of the many failures and setbacks suf-
fered by the Arab armies in the region of Zabulistān, Sistān and 
Makrān. At the outset, al-Balādhurā reproduces a caution given 
to the third caliph ‘Uthman (d 655), who hoped to restrict the 
movement of rebellious forces to and from the region, and re-
ceived this report from a scout to the region: “‘O Commander of 
the Believers, I examined it and know it well.’ The caliph said, 
‘Describe it’. He said, ‘The water supply is sparse; the dates are 
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inferior; and the robbers are bold. A small army would be lost 
there, and a large army would starve.’”6 That caution shadows 
the narration of the various Muslim campaigns to the region – al-
Balādhurī repeatedly refers to the breaking of frontier treaties, 
the decimation of established garrison cities, the assassination of 
governors or their removal due to corruption. In his narrative, 
this eastern frontier of the Umayyad empire remains volatile and 
unsettled, continuously draining the coffers. The list of armies 
and commanders given by al-Balādhurī’ illustrates the continual 
pressure the frontier exerted on the Umayyad. In 663-64, 
‘Abdallāh b Sawwār al-‘Abdi leads two expeditions to Kikān, per-
ishing in the second. In 665, Sinān ibn Salamah reaches Makrān 
and establishes a fort. Sinān’s conquest, however, is short-lived, 
as the fort goes in and out of Arab control until 672 when al-
Mundhir ibn al-Jarūd al-‘Abdiis is able to recapture it. The local 
political and social powers, such as the Zunbīls of Zamīn-dawar 
and Zābulistān, and the Kābulshāhs of Kabul, were sometimes 
persuaded to pay tribute but, according to al-Balādhurī, due to 
the lack of a standing Arab army, they often changed their minds 
and remained ferocious opponents.  
The Zābulistān campaigns left a deeper historical mark – the 
Umayyad sent the governor ‘Ubaidallah b Abi Bakra to Zābulistān 
at the head of the Jaish al-Tawawis (Army of Destruction) to sub-
due the region in 698. They were caught, captured and largely 
decimated, putting an end to Umayyad expeditions to the region 
for the next decade.7 It provoked a number of poetical and mythical 
accounts of the doomed army. One of these is preserved in the 
early 10th century geographical treatise Kitāb al-Masālik wa’l- 
Mamālik (Book of Roads and Kingdoms) by Ibn Khurdādhbih 
(d 913), where he reproduces a popular lament about the many 
graves of fallen Arab soldiers in Kandahar.8 
This engagement – military and political – also stimulated a 
production of knowledge about this frontier in all the genres that 
usually constitute imperial knowledge, the historical, the admin-
istrative, the geographical, and the wondrous. As mentioned ear-
lier, the first reported embassy from Baghdad to the al-Hind and 
al-Sind departed in 800, and became the basis of numerous geo-
graphical and historical accounts. A number of key Arab geogra-
phers visited Arab Sind in the 9th, 10th and 11th centuries. How-
ever, there is a general deficiency in “official” Muslim accounts 
when it comes to this frontier. The universal histories, such as of 
those al-Tabariī (d 923) and al-Ya’qūbī (d 897), provide little cov-
erage of al-Hind w’al-Sind. This scarcity in the historical and geo-
graphical texts is read, in secondary literature, as indicating the 
lack of political and religious significance of Sindh to the Arab 
polity. Khalid Blankinship, for example, notes that there is an 
“overwhelming geographical bias” towards the metropolitan cit-
ies of Iraq, with the consequence that “the importance of events 
is only measured by their nearness to and impact on the capital 
city”.9 But that seems to be a limited understanding of both the 
frontier and the centre – or at least a decidedly atomic one, with 
concretised stable notions of “centre” and “frontier”. 
As is apparent from the various geographical and historical 
accounts, Arab Sind, especially during the time of Arab political 
and military presence, played a powerful role in the genre of lit-
erature known as ‘ajāib wa ghar’āib (wonders and miracles). The 
‘ajāib al-Hind (marvels of India) texts, which emerge in the late 
ninth century, act as a well-noted locus of historical, geographical 
and exotic information on this frontier. In this genre, which also 
contains a large number of mercantile and naval accounts, lies an 
exotic landscape that is filled with gold-carrying ants, giant eagles 
and other terrible creatures – some in Kashmir, some in Kabul, 
some in Multan. An examination of the wondrous tales in the 
‘ajāib al-Hind genre reveals that it borrowed heavily from Greek 
accounts, often reproducing tales from the second or third centu-
ries BCE (Before the Common Era), with slight modifications, in 
Arabo-Islamic guises.10 That these fantastic elements mingled, 
within the same text, with dynamically produced nautical re-
ports on distances, wind currents, and port conditions reflect the 
carefully calibrated knowing/unknowing that situated itself in 
the empire’s frontier. 
It is to the persistence of this literary and political imagination 
of the thughr (frontier) that we can credit the appearance of 
Adam’s mirror in the 11th century text. And it is a similar literary 
and political imagination, which rests uncomfortably in the im-
perial heart that shapes our present-day understandings of that 
same frontier. For more than 250 years, the frontier of al-Hind 
w’al-Sind remained static in the imperial vision, onto which could 
be projected the fantastic, the bizarre, and the incomprehensible. 
During that same period, the Indian Ocean trade re-emerged as a 
dominant link; and a vast intellectual and ideological transfer of 
communities occurred, generating site-specific knowledge. That 
this frontier, though within the confines of the empire, retained 
the allure of the exotic and the fear, reflected the balance of 
knowing and unknowing that constituted the empire’s others. 
Any recuperative act against the empire, any historiographical 
corrective to the imperial narratives, must begin by examining 
this imagination, but it cannot stop there. It has to situate itself 
on the frontier, locating itself outside Adam’s mirror. 
The View from the Frontier
In 1868, in an essay titled “Democratic Vistas”, poet-philosopher 
Walt Whitman made a prediction about the American frontier.
In a few years the dominion-heart of America will be far inland, to-
ward the West. Our future national capital may not be where the 
present one is. It is possible, nay likely, that in less than 50 years, it will 
migrate a thousand or two miles, will be re-founded, and every thing 
belonging to it made on a different plan, original, far more superb.11 
This magnetic pull of the frontier on the centre, which is pow-
ered by the demand for new talent, for new energy, for new 
“stock”, is rarely remarked upon in the literature on centre- 
periphery models. In Whitman is a subtext worth explicitly not-
ing – the frontier is not empty. The inhabitants of this frontier, 
the space towards which the empire must advance, are the neces-
sary fodder to propel the movement. It is quite possible to read, in 
this sense, the movement of Islamicate capitals towards the fron-
tier of al-Hind wa’l Sind – from Damascus to Baghdad to Samarra 
to Ghazna and Ghur and the influx of Persian, of Turkic, of Indian 
populations, found at the “frontier”, who settle the characteristics 
of the empire “with all the old retain’d, but more expanded, 
grafted on newer, hardier, purely native stock.”12 The logical 
extension of such a reading would be to place ourselves on the 
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frontier and examine the ways in which the empire is reflected 
and refracted in histories and policies. To pay attention to the 
localised production of history and memory is not just a passive 
scholarly act of locating “agency” in archives. It is to arrest the 
narratives that the empire generates about itself. It is to decon-
textualise the only context that appears relevant – the imperial 
one. This shift in perspective is not merely a corrective, but a 
critical one, as it reveals that the oft-designated “frontier” has a 
centrality all of its own.
By the time of al-Mu’tasịm (813-33), the ‘Abbāsids had sent a 
long list of governors to the region of al-Hind w’al Sind. The 
period between the death of al-Mu’tasịm and the assassination of 
al-Mutawakil (833-61) is one of a fairly stable court in Baghdad. A 
large influx of hadīth scholars, grammarians, and theologians 
made their way to the port cities in Gujarat and Sindh, and up 
towards Lahore. Similarly, the traffic from al-Hind across the 
Arabian Gulf to the cities of Baghdad and Cairo flourished. Pottery 
and coins gathered from Sāmarrā, Fustāt, Daybul and Mansūra 
show that a cross-regional trade flourished during this period. 
One sign of the stability of this trade was the numerous regional 
power centres that flourished in the 9th and 10th centuries – the 
Mahāniya in Gujarat, the Habāri in Sindh, and the Saffārids and 
the Sāmānids from Ghazna to Multan. The Ghaznawids (962-
1186) are perhaps most well known for extending their empire 
across most of al-Hind wa’l Sind, threading together all the cities 
from Ghazna to Lahore to the lower Indus valley. The establish-
ment of the Delhi Sultanate, out of the fragments of the Ghurid 
empire, once again created a new political space in the broader 
region encompassing the frontier. The 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th 
centuries saw the establishment of polities with political and 
social bases in Sindh, Baluchistan and southern Afghanistan – 
the Sumrā and the Sammā (based in Makrān), the Arghān 
(based in Kandahār), and the Tarkhān. Surrounding them were 
the gunpowder empires – the Uzbek (1500-1785), the Mughal 
(1526-1858) and the Safavid (1501-1722), who often insisted that 
this was a frontier – a meeting of borderlines, conflict zones, and 
uncontrollable chaos. Hence the adventures of Babar in 1520, 
Akbar in 1592, Nadir Shah in 1739, Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1753, 
and, perhaps most relevantly, the East India Company in 1843.
The above string of political dynasties and concerns each left 
their traces in history – built environments, circulated objects, 
cultural memories. All of which provide a radically different con-
ception of space, boundaries and belonging than the view from 
the capitals of Baghdad, Delhi, Agra or London. Consider the 
early 13th century Persian text, written in Thatta, Sindh, and 
popularly known as Chachnama. Describing for its courtly audi-
ence, a portrait of seventh century al-Sind, it presents a strictly 
bounded vision of the polity that existed before Islam’s arrival.
Narrators of reports and historians write that the city of Aror, which 
was the capital of al-Hind and al-Sind, was a great city by the river 
Sehwan (which we call Mehran), filled with varied palaces, colourful 
pastures, canals, fountains, gardens, and flower gardens. And in this 
lively city was a Hindu Raja by the name of Rai Sehras b Sehasi who had 
immeasurable treasures and riches. His justice was known around the 
world and his philanthropy was legendary. To the East, his  kingdom 
extended to Kashmir; in the west to Makran, in the south to Daybul and 
the sea shore, and to the north to the Qiqans. To each frontier, he had 
appointed four governors – one in Brahmanabad, one in Sistan, one in 
Iskandari, and one in the great city of Multan. He himself remained in the 
capital and kept a close relationship with his frontier governors, sup-
plying them with troops and arms. He gave them strict orders to guard 
the borders of their domains so that no outsider could break through.13 
The text goes on to describe the rule of a brahmin king Chach, 
who conquers this kingdom and proceeds to visit the borders of 
his new polity.
At Kashmir, he planted two trees – one oak and one beech and he 
waited for them to grow and their branches to entangle with each 
other. This, he declared, was the border between the Raja of Kashmir 
and us. No one will go across without permission. At Makran he plant-
ed a bushel of date trees and inscribed on the trunk an insignia of his 
court – marking the limit of his rule. By Sistan, he had erected a bell 
tower with five trumpets which would sound at dawn and at dusk.14
This already-realised picture of kingship is markedly different, 
of course, from the claims of a Chakravartin, a Sultan-e Kamil or 
a Badhshah-e Alam or other designations reserved for kings, con-
querors and rulers, whose domain was always the world in its 
entirety. Its careful delineation of terrain is also largely invisible 
to scholarship because it does not fit the centre-periphery or the 
frontier model.
Keeping in mind that this Persian text was produced on the 
frontier, we can add a string of such localised texts, which are not 
concerned with the imperial capitals but with their own region. 
The Tarikh-i Tabakāt-i Mubarākshahī, written in early 16th cen-
tury, which is our only primary source for the Sammā, and the 
Tarikh-i Tahirī, written in the mid-16th century, were both pro-
duced in the town of Thatta. In both, the Mughal empire, the do-
ings of Humayun and Akbar, are mere backgrounds against 
which regional concerns are paramount – the tales of ascensions 
and victories, the descriptions of forts, cities and ports (especially 
of Thatta, Multan, Lahore, and Kandahar), the recounting of folk 
romances and biographical notes on notable poets and Sufis. Un-
like the materials completed in the capital, these texts are not fo-
cused on exotica or anxiety, but on the lived lives of the commu-
nities that surround them. In the 17th century, Tarikh-i Ma’sumi 
and Beglarnama; in the 18th century, Tuhfāt ul-Kirām; and in the 
19th century, Lubb-e Tarikh-i Sind were some of the key texts 
 produced in the frontier of al-Sind. 
The most critical intervention these frontier texts provide is 
information on local customs, local culture and biographies of 
notables. It seems a banal point to make that the imperial gaze to 
the frontier always aimed to generalise from the particular, to 
deduce patterns, to predict behaviour. The power of these partic-
ular texts lies in shifting the descriptive focus away from the di-
agnostic or the programmatic to the lived and the social. It is a 
perception of space utterly lacking in Adam’s mirror. 
Take Tūhfat ul-Kirām (Gifts of the Generous) by Mir ‘Ali Sher 
Qāni (1727-1788), a history attuned to the spiritual and mystical 
leaders of Sindh – narrating folk epics and oral histories of vari-
ous towns, centres and graveyards. Qāni authored more than 42 
works, including numerous compendiums of poetry (he excelled 
in the mathnāvi and qasidā); a dictionary of Persian poets in 
Sindh, Muq’allāt-e Shur’ā (1760); a history from the ‘Abbasids to 
the Kalhōra, Tar’īkh-i ‘Abbasi (1761); and a truly unique cultural 
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history of Sindh, incorporating everything from fashion to culi-
nary skills and means of relaxation, Nisāb ul-Bulghā (1783). 
Tuhfāt ul-Kirām (1761) comprises three volumes. The first deals 
with the history of the prophets down to the early Caliphs. The 
second is divided into seven sections – each containing histories 
of cities and towns in Sindh, Baluchistan, and Afghanistan, 
along with their spiritual and ruling elite. The third volume is 
dedicated to the history of the region, ending with the Kalhorā 
 dynasty. Tuhfāt ul-Kirām concerns itself primarily with cultural 
and spiritual aspects, intertwining romances, culinary prac-
tices, Sufi hagiographies and discussions of the magical proper-
ties of everyday objects. In all, Qāni uses the history of the re-
gion, of institutions, of households, to illustrate the “pre-emi-
nence” of certain practices and to promote a regional viewpoint, 
which he laments is absent in the works on history composed at 
the courts.
These histories, these tombs, these political philosophies, po-
litical theologies, manuals of governance, and genealogies of rule 
are the missing links in Clinton’s historical narrative (“my flying 
over that terrain, my awareness of the history going back to 
 Alexander the Great and, certainly, the imperial British mili-
tary”). My attempt to fill in the gap is not an attempt at biblio-
graphic or encyclopedic completeness. It is an attempt to reduce 
the teleological distance (the more than 2,100 years that separate 
Alexander from imperial Britain in that “terrain”), to give valence 
to contexts more valid to this particular imperial adventure.
At the Edges of the US Empire
The debate about the “empire-ness” of the post-1989 US acquired 
momentum during the 2001-03 period, when its military and 
political retaliation to the 11 September 2001 attacks created a 
starkly new geopolitical world. Taking the late 19th century British 
Empire as the yardstick for all imperial measurements, historian 
Niall Ferguson declared in October 2001 that the US had to be-
come a colonial imperial power or risk losing the world to chaos.15 
This judgment did not catch on per se, as despite admini strators 
such as Zalmay Khalilzad, Jay Garner and L Paul Bremer, the US 
decided to restrict the colonial angle of its imperial processes. 
Hence, the petulant declaration by then Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld in April 2003, “We don’t seek empires … We’re 
not imperialistic. We never have been.”16 Taken at face value, 
such protestations are taken as evidence that the US is an “anti-
colonial” empire, one that has never been interested in possess-
ing colonies (hence, never developed an administrative or serv-
ice core of colonial bureaucracies).17 But, it does not take away 
the imperial vision on a global scale that has bound successive US 
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Notes
 1 Ghāda al Hijjāwī al-Qaddūmī (1998): Book of Gifts 
and Rarities (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press): 175.
 2 Distance here, however, cannot be read literally. 
Arab Sind was not at some great distance from 
the governors in Bahrain or Oman, or from Da-
mascus or Baghdad, for that matter. However, 
Arab Sind remained at a great remove in the im-
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regimes and the public since the very beginning. Here, as a crude 
example, is an ode, written by Francis Hopkinson, printed on 
pamphlets and distributed at the Independence Day parade on 
4 July 1788, in Philadelphia: “O for a muse of fire! to mount the 
skies/And to a listening world proclaim/Behold! behold! an em-
pire rise!”18 The ode was titled “Columbia’s Triumph”, using the 
now almost forgotten title for a US that extended its triumph be-
yond the seas.
‘Tis done! ‘tis done! my sons, she cries, 
In war are valiant and in council wise. 
Wisdom and valour shall my rights defend,
And o’er my vast domain those rights extend. 
Science shall flourish, genius stretch her wing, 
In native strains Columbian muses sing: 
Wealth crown the arts, and Justice cleanse her scales,
Commerce her pon’drous anchor weigh 
… Wide spread her sails. 
And in far distant seas her flag display.19
This vision of a global imperial reach was clearly articulated 
early. The world beyond was always visible, always attainable – 
Jedidiah Morse’s The American Universal Geography (1797) had 
by its fifth edition a long chapter on “Sindetic Hindoostan”, cover-
ing the cities of “Lahore, Cashmere, Cabul, Ghisni, or Gasna, 
Candahar, Moultan, and Tatta”. This awareness of a global geo-
graphy and the availability of global capital are most clearly visi-
ble in the 1856 Guano Islands Act. Goaded by that same spirit, the 
1821 treaty between the East India Company and the Talpurs of 
Sindh expressely forbid “other Europeans and Americans the right 
to settle in Sind”.20 This 1821 treaty was subsumed by the 1830 
treaty and finally abrogated when the Company annexed Sindh 
in 1843, in the aftermath of the disastrous first Anglo-Afghan War of 
1841. The annexation, as has been convincingly argued by John Y 
Yong, was driven in large parts by the Company’s desire to further 
control the production and transportation of opium from Bengal’s 
plantations to China. As Yong describes the global network of 
opium, the US military and mercantile interests were intimately 
linked as procurers and transporters in the Indian Ocean.21 
What is striking is that neither the regional histories nor the 
US’ own imperial past are visible in present narratives, and neither 
is brought to bear in the postcolonial scholarly engagement 
with Pax Americana. The overwhelmingly prevalent comparative 
project to the US empire remains the British example in west 
Asia and south Asia. The critiques levelled against US strategies 
in Afghanistan or Pakistan are rarely themselves cognisant of 
historical pasts of the region, and rarely entangle themselves in 
locally produced narratives. The effort to generalise from parti-
cularities gives us reams of scholarship on “tribes” or “Islamism”, 
which recycle, at best, British colonial strategies of control and 
domination. Adam’s mirror, as a metaphor, reflects one trope of 
an epistemological engagement with the frontier – that of direct, 
unfiltered reportage, the ultimate informant who holds no bias, 
and where there is no need to sift the personality from the knowl-
edge. In starker terms, the frontier remains a fixed, stagnant 
space from the point of view of the empire – whether the 
Umayyad Adam’s mirror or the US drone’s view-finder. Adam’s 
mirror shows its limitation not in itself – in the object – but in its 
raison d’être – the gazer’s intent. 
